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BORDER WARS: ANALYZING THE
DISPUTE OVER GROUNDWATER
BETWEEN TEXAS AND MEXICO
Philip Dunlap*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE area surrounding the United States-Mexico border has long
been a fascination of Americans. This allure is apparent through
literature, music, and, perhaps most noticeably, film. From old
movies like Rio Bravo to more modern movies like Young Guns and
Desperado, the borderlands have a unique hold on American attention.
This is not surprising considering the history and culture of the border
area. For some, the sheer distance of the United States-Mexico border
catches their attention. Although the border is extremely long, more
than half of the international boundary between these two countries is in
Texas, giving the Lone Star State the largest international border of any
state in the contiguous United States.1 The 1,254-mile portion of the Rio
Grande (Rio Bravo in Mexico) has been described as the most dramatic
international boundary on earth.2
The border is defined as the area within 100 kilometers of either side of
the international boundary.3 But for Texas's purposes, the border is more
aptly described as all land south of Interstate 10 from El Paso to San
Antonio, and then east of Interstate 37.4 The border has a current popu-
lation nearing 10 million,5 which is a 400 percent increase in the last fifty
years. 6 The number of people living along the Rio Grande is expected to
*Philip Dunlap is a third year law student at Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law, and this comment won the International Law Review
Association's prestigious award-Best Comment of 2005.
1. John Sharp, BORDERING THE Fum-RE: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE
TEXAS BORDER REGION 1 (July 1998), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/
border/ch01/ch01.html#1.
2. Id.
3. M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated Envi-
ronmental Plan for the Mexican-United States Border Area, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639,
646 (1993).
4. Sharp, supra note 1, at 6.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Damien M. Schiff, Article, Rollin, Rollin, Rollin on the River: A Story of Drought,
Treaty Interpretation, and Other Rio Grande Problems, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 117, 119 (2003).
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rise from the current 5 million to 11 million by 2030.7 Additionally, the
region has experienced a shift from an agricultural based society to a
modern industrialized economy.8 Accompanying this growth, the border-
land has seen an increase in the obstacles it faces concerning water
availability. 9
"The essential, defining geographic characteristic of the borderland is
its aridity-the scarcity of water."'1 The Rio Grande, the main source of
above-ground freshwater in this region, exhibits such scarcity. The once
grand river has recently become so low that it even stopped flowing into
the Gulf of Mexico." The depletion from over-consumption of the Rio
Grande coupled with the widespread drought that occurred in the 1990s
has made groundwater the "principal source of supply for many border
communities and a necessary resource for agriculture.' 2 But reliance on
groundwater has also led to the depletion of these sources, particularly in
areas along the Rio Grande. 13 The groundwater basins, or aquifers, have
been depleted due to several factors, including the population boom in
border cities and growth in irrigation-intensive agriculture in the border
area.14
The scarcity of this resource, coupled with the necessity of water to
support all forms of life, has led to a conflict between the United States
and Mexico that began as early as 1848 and continues to the present. 15
The conflict remains in part because the United States and Mexico not
only share the Rio Grande, but also eighteen groundwater sources.' 6
Groundwater is vital to the United States because approximately one-half
of the population relies on groundwater as its principal source for drink-
ing water.' 7 This number will likely increase in the future as surface
water sources are further depleted and/or contaminated.' 8 Moreover,
resolution of this dispute is complicated by the fact that no official law or
treaty on groundwater exists.' 9 As a result, the safe and efficient use of
surface and groundwater remains one of the most pressing issues in
7. Hugh Dellios, Sharing the Rio Grande; Water Problems are Wave of the Future,
CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2002, at 1.
8. Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century "Minute," 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163
(2004).
9. See Raimo Vayrynen, Environment, Violence, and Political Change, 15 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 593, 605 (2001).
10. Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S. -Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts
and Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973, 973 (2000).
11. Dellios, supra note 7.
12. Maria Rosa Garcia-Acevedo & Helen Ingram, Conflict in the Borderlands,
NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, July 1, 2004, at 19, 19.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Amy Hardberger, Comment, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of In-
ternational Groundwater Policy Along the United States-Mexico Border and a
Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 1234 (2004).
16. Id.
17. A. DAN TURLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4:4 (2004).
18. Id.
19. See Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1215.
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United States-Mexico boundary relations.20
This comment will examine the conflict over shared groundwater be-
tween Texas and Mexico and evaluate possible resolutions. Part II traces
the development of groundwater and how treaties have dealt with inter-
national groundwater in the past.21 Part III discusses the current state of
groundwater law in Texas and Mexico 2 2 and the various agreements con-
cerning international water and groundwater. 23 Part IV examines possi-
ble remedies and suggests the course of action the United States,
specifically Texas, and Mexico should take.2 4 Finally, Part V concludes
with a review of the shared groundwater sources and a proposal for main-
taining an adequate water supply for both sides of the border.25
II. HISTORY OF GROUNDWATER LAW
"Water law has historically treated surface and sub-surface water sepa-
rately. '26 But this view should no longer be accepted because scientists
now recognize that the interrelatedness of surface water and groundwater
is necessary for groundwater administration. 27 Groundwater and surface
water sources are both part of the hydrologic system.2 8 The hydrologic
system, or cycle, is the system where "water - solid, liquid, gas, or vapor -
travels from the atmosphere to the Earth and back again in a constant
cycle of renewal." '29
The hydrologic cycle has been called "the continuous circulation of
water on earth."' 30 This occurs as water falls to the earth as precipitation
in the form of rain, snow, or sleet. 31 Upon hitting the land it becomes
surface water, typically running over the land into rivers, lakes, or
streams.32 Any time water exists as surface water it eventually evapo-
rates and returns to the atmosphere, beginning the cycle again.33
Alternatively, water may seep or percolate into the ground becoming
groundwater. 34 Water that percolates seeps into the earth vertically until
reaching the groundwater table. 35 At that point, the water begins to flow
laterally "through the porous spaces in the geologic formation, thereby
20. Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North America's Management
of its Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1993).
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:35.
27. Barber, supra note 3, at 651.
28. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:5.
29. Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Trans-
boundary Ground Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 201, 207 (2003).
30. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1214.
31. Eckstein, supra note 29, at 207.
32. Id. at 207-08.




218 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
forming an aquifer. ' 36 Once groundwater has become part of an aquifer,
it may discharge in the form of surface water and eventually evaporate
into the atmosphere, beginning the ,cycle again.37 Although the rate of
percolation into the groundwater table and the flow of water within aqui-
fers are not as fast as the flow of surface water, both processes are consis-
tent; thus, even regarding groundwater, the hydrologic cycle remains
continuous. 38 Water appears in solid, liquid, and gaseous states. But, be-
cause the total amount of water in nature is fixed, the volume in each
state varies at any time.39
Unfortunately, the law of groundwater has not always recognized such
a continuous relationship despite attempts by lawyers to integrate these
rules of nature.40 Because groundwater has largely been seen as inciden-
tal to land ownership, it has rarely been regulated per se.41 While scien-
tists have finally accepted and professed the idea that surface water and
groundwater are interrelated, most "states cling to their historical doc-
trines, unwilling to consider what modern science has revealed." 42
A. DEVELOPMENT OF GROUNDWATER LAW
Groundwater is defined as "[w]ater found in layers of permeable rock
or soil."'43 It has also been described as the type of "water from which
wells and springs are fed."'44 While both definitions are fitting, the term is
perhaps best defined as "subsurface water that occurs beneath the water
table in soils and geologic formations that are fully saturated." 45 Ground-
water is most often found in aquifers, or "geological formations that
store, transmit, and yield.., water. '' 46 As aquifers are depleted, they can
be replenished by underground and surface streams and by precipitation
as it seeps through to the aquifers. 47 But even within aquifers, ground-
water is distinguished by the manner in which it travels through the soil.48
Groundwater may be percolating as part of an underflow or an under-
ground stream, or part of an artesian source. 49 Percolating water "oozes
36. Id.
37. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1214.
38. Eckstein, supra note 29, at 209.
39. Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary Ground-
water, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167 (1991).
40. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:5.
41. Barber, supra note 3, at 641.
42. Id. at 651; Cf TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 6:20 (explaining the integration of sur-
face and groundwater rights in New Mexico).
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (8th ed. 2004).
44. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 973 (2d ed. 1991).
45. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1217 (internal citations omitted).
46. Dylan 0. Drummond, Comment, Texas Groundwater Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: A Compendium of Historical Approaches, Current Problems, and Future So-
lutions Focusing on the High Plains Aquifer and the Panhandle, 4 TEX. TECH. J.
TEX. ADMIN. L. 173, 175-76 (2003).
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id.
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or seeps through the soil without a defined channel." 50 Alternatively, un-
derflow has been described as "aquiferous water that flows beneath a
surface water course, mainly occurring in sand and gravel deposits found
beneath a surface water course's streambed, but hydrologically connected
to the surface flow of the stream. '51 An underground stream is a subsur-
face watercourse that has all the characteristics of a surface watercourse,
including ascertainable banks and channels, but exists underground.52 Fi-
nally, artesian water is "groundwater confined under pressure by an im-
permeable geologic layer."' 53 Because the majority of groundwater found
near the Texas-Mexico border exists in aquifers, the chief focus of this
comment will be on the groundwater found in aquifers in general. 54
1. English Rule-Absolute Ownership
Groundwater law began as a simple rule of capture that only applied to
owners of land overlying groundwater.55 This first rule of law was the
absolute ownership rule, or the English rule, which holds that the "over-
lying landowner has an unqualified privilege to extract groundwater for
any purpose regardless of the consequences to surrounding landown-
ers."'56 This rule developed from the case of Acton v. Blundell, where the
extraction of groundwater was analogized to the erection of an artificial
structure. 57 The court in Acton found that, because the promotion of
land development was important, it did not want to restrict a landowner's
ability to extract groundwater from his property.58 These rules led to the
notion that "[a]djoining landowners injured by pumping are limited to
the remedy of self-help."'59 Additionally, the rule of capture allowed a
landowner to withdraw limitless amounts of water from beneath his prop-
erty without any liability being imposed for causing harm to his neighbor
who relies upon the same aquifer.60
In addition to unlimited use, under the English rule no ownership
rights in groundwater develop until someone actually pumps the water.61
Moreover, because groundwater goes unseen for the most part, American
courts initially held it would be unfair to compel landowners to redress
wrongs that could not have been noticed. 62 Early American courts analo-
gized underground water to minerals ferae naturae because it has the abil-
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (8th ed. 2004).
51. Drummond, supra note 46, at 210 n.313.
52. Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 550 (1983).
53. Drummond, supra note 46, at 210 n.315.
54. See Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1234.
55. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:6.
56. Id.
57. Id. (internal citations omitted).
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Drummond, supra note 46, at 197.
61. Id.
62. See Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 534 (1855); TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:6.
20061
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ity "to escape without the volition of the owner. '63 This comparison
allowed the English rule, or rule of capture, to be justified by American
courts.64 While the doctrine of absolute ownership was extended for
some time by American courts to include allowances for malicious pump-
ing, today most courts would not allow purely malicious pumping of
groundwater since such actions are inefficient and unfair.65
2. American Rule-Reasonable Use
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, many com-
mon law states abandoned the English rule in favor of the American or
reasonable use rule.66 The New Hampshire Supreme Court first de-
scribed this rule, holding that landowner's rights are correlative and that
each landowner should be "restricted the reasonable exercise of his own
rights and a reasonable use of his own property in view of the similar
rights of others. '67
The American rule developed when high capacity pumping upset ex-
isting pumpers' expectations about the accustomed rules of competition
for groundwater. 68 When municipalities began to sink high capacity wells
in rural areas in order to extract water for city use, courts limited the use
of groundwater to overlying lands in order to protect farmers from unfair
competition.69 This rule also developed as a response to the rule of cap-
ture, essentially qualifying that rule. 70 The reasonable use rule has slowly
gained acceptance, and today many states follow some form of this use
rule, including Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Ma-
ryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia. 71
The American rule exists as a modified absolute ownership rule.72 The
distinguishing factor is the requirement of a reasonable use of water.73
Whether water use is reasonable is determined by a number of factors,
including "well location, amount of water, and the proposed use and
placement of the water."'74 In addition to the American rule, the reasona-
ble use rule also encompasses the Restatement rule.75 The difference in
these two rules centers on the use of the water once it has been with-
63. See Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889);
TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:6.
64. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:6.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 4:7.
67. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:7; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577
(1862)
68. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:8.
69. See Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963); TURLOCK, supra note
17, § 4:8.
70. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:8.
71. Id. § 4:7; Drummond, supra note 46, at 198.
72. Drummond, supra note 46, at 198.
73. Id. at 197.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 198.
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drawn from an aquifer. The American rule allows the withdrawn water
to be used only on the land overlying the aquifer or within the same
drainage basin, while the Restatement rule permits the withdrawn water
to be used outside of the overlying land. 76 Under the American rule,
groundwater use has three restraints: "(1) The use must be reasonable,
(2) the use must be for a beneficial purpose on the overlying land, and (3)
use on non-overlying land is per se unreasonable. '' 77 Thus, municipalities
are held liable for pumping water from an aquifer and then transporting
that water for city use if the city does not sit over the aquifer.
3. Texas Groundwater Law
Groundwater law, like most other areas of law in Texas, developed
from Spanish and Mexican law. 78 In fact, water rights that arose from
surface estates in Texas prior to established common law are governed by
the Spanish or Mexican law that stood in place at the time of the land
grant.79 Because Texas became a Republic upon achieving independence
from Mexico and later became a state of the United States, the law of
Texas changed from Mexican and Spanish law while under Mexican au-
thority, to Texas law while an independent republic, to a mix of federal
and state law as part of the United States.80 Thus, water law in Texas has
gone through change and evolutions over time, but has finally settled at
the rule of capture, or absolute ownership. 81
In 1904, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the English rule of absolute
ownership. 82 In that decision, the court held that a defendant railway
company's digging of a well on its property, which was absorbing waters
percolating through the ground and depriving plaintiff of the use of his
well, was not an actionable wrong, even though the court found that the
defendant's use of its well was unreasonable.83 Thus the court estab-
lished the rule of capture, allowing a landowner to enjoy unlimited rights
to groundwater regardless of the effect on adjacent landowners, which
has been consistently upheld by Texas courts.84
Although many other states have adopted the reasonable use or Amer-
ican rule throughout the years, Texas has continued to follow the rule of
capture. 85 One reason suggested for why Texas has not modified its
groundwater law despite other states' making the change is that, "Texas's
pervasive culture of private ownership causes citizens to think property
possession extends to unlimited use of all associated resources, which cre-
76. Id.
77. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:8.
78. Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water Law-A Tribute to
Jack Pope, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 21 (1986).
79. Id.
80. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 5:10
81. Id. § 4:6.
82. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
83. Id. at 280, 282.
84. Barber, supra note 3, at 678-79.
85. Drummond, supra note 46, at 208.
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ates a significant barrier to groundwater law modification. '86 This incli-
nation towards private ownership exists in Texas because over 94 percent
of land is privately owned.87 Therefore, federal law may have less influ-
ence on Texas than it would in another state. 88 This has also led to
Texas's being one of only a few states that still follows the absolute own-
ership rule.89
The Texas Supreme Court has continually upheld the doctrine, as seen
in recent cases like Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest In-
dustries, Inc., and Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc.90 In
Friendswood, plaintiffs alleged that defendants caused severe subsidence,
or sinking of the ground, on their land due to continued withdrawal of
underground water from wells on defendant's land.91 The court refused
to limit the withdrawal of groundwater without any showing of willful
waste or malicious injury.92 But the court did establish prospective liabil-
ity for negligent pumping that is a proximate cause of the neighboring
land's subsidence. 93
Likewise, the court has upheld the rule of capture as recently as 1999
when it rejected the theory of reasonable use in Sipriano.94 There, prop-
erty owners sued a water bottler for negligently draining their water
wells. 95 The court refused to substitute the reasonable use rule, instead
choosing to follow the established Texas law of the rule of capture.96 The
reasoning was "that the sweeping change to Texas's groundwater law
[plaintiff] Sipriano urges this Court to make is not appropriate at this
time."' 97 The court declined to change the Texas common law because it
felt the change in law should occur as a result of the legislature. 98 This
decision was based in part on the Friendswood holding that groundwater
falls under the police power of the state because it qualifies as real prop-
erty.99 Therefore, until Senate Bill 1100 enacts some change, the rule of
capture remains the groundwater law in Texas.
86. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1222.
87. Drummond, supra note 46, at 203.
88. See id.
89. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 4:6 (Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island
are the other states).
90. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978);
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
91. Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 21.
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 30.
94. Drummond, supra note 46, at 209.
95. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 75.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Drummond, supra note 46, at 210.
99. Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 30; Drummond, supra note 46, at 210.
100. See discussion infra Part Ill(A).
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4. Mexican Groundwater Law
Similar to Texas, groundwater law in Mexico developed from Spanish
law. New Spain, the area that included present day Mexico and Texas,
applied Las Siete Partidas (Partidas), a civil code developed by King
Alonso V in 1265 to govern water allocation and disputes. 0 1 The Span-
ish derived their law partly from Roman law, but also from Moorish
law. 10 2 Roman law, like Native American law, held that running water
was not the property of an individual, but rather common to all.10 3 Run-
ning water was classified as "'res communes' [meaning] 'things com-
mon'", similar to the air, the sea, fish and wild beasts, and the light and
heat of the sun.1 0 4 Roman law included running water in this group be-
cause at one instant it is in one place in the river, then it is gone and some
other water has succeeded it, without anyone having been able to say that
he had it as his own; a thing of continual motion and ceaseless change,
not susceptible of exclusive possession nor, hence, of ownership. 10 5
But Roman law maintained a distinction between the use of the water
and the water itself.1 0 6 Thus, Spanish law under the Partidas maintained
the same distinction.107 This difference between water use and ownership
provided the basis for the Partidas groundwater law provision, stating
that a landowner could dig a well even if that well reduced a neighbor's
subsurface water.'0 8 The only limitation on this right to pump water was
that it could not be done maliciously just to deny access to an adjacent
landowner.' 0 9
While Roman tradition had a significant influence on Spanish law, the
Moorish influence is thought responsible for the idea in former Spanish
colonies that water belonged to the community."x 0 A water law scholar
has noted:
It is important in considering the Spanish system to bear in mind that
its primary concern was with the common use of waters, with their
administration in such a fashion that the community interests were
served and the fertility of the land preserved, rather than with prior
and exclusive rights."'
Spanish law was similar to the English rule of absolute ownership, but
added that water underlying public lands constitutes public ground-
101. Barber, supra note 3, at 656.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Harbert Davenport & J.T. Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters with Special




107. See Barber, supra note 3, at 657.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 659.
110. Id. at 658.
111. BETTY E. DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 98 (1959); see
also Barber, supra note 3, at 661.
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water.t1 2 Thus, even to this day, Mexican law has maintained the distinc-
tion between public and private groundwater.11 3 This distinction explains
why the Mexican government regulates groundwater use based on the
order of priorities for the water source.114 Thus, the government may
declare a public use of groundwater as more important than a private use.
B. TREATIES COVERING GROUNDWATER
Because Texas and Mexico have always been and will continue to be
linked by their shared use of the Rio Grande and aquifers, this unique
relationship must be recognized in any attempt to establish rules gov-
erning both nations.115 But because Texas, as part of the United States,
and Mexico are separate nations, they do not have a uniform law gov-
erning their shared water resources. "The joint use of international wa-
tercourses has always depended on the cooperation between countries
along their banks, regulated in some cases by international treaties and
organizations."'1 6 Thus, the United States and Mexico have historically
relied on treaties to administrate their water matters. But because trea-
ties and agreements that have mentioned international groundwater have
rarely made it the focus, little consensus exists on how to handle ground-
water issues. 117 Due to the dearth of international groundwater treaties
in existence, an examination of past international water treaties is neces-
sary to see what a new groundwater treaty covering Texas and Mexico
should include.
1. Nineteenth-Century Treaties
In 1848, the United States and Mexico ended the Mexican-American
War by enacting the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement
with the Republic of Mexico, otherwise known as the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.1 18 Article VII of the treaty provided, in regards to
the Rio Grande as the international border, that both nations have the
right to navigate the waters but that neither can unilaterally "construct
any work that may impede or interrupt, in whble or in part, the exercise
of this right."1 19 Article VII of the treaty was later reaffirmed in 1853 by
the signing of the Gadsden Purchase.120 Mexico relied on this provision
to protest the construction of the Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico,
stating that the development would reduce the flow of water reaching
112. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1243.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See Ingram, supra note 8, at 168.
116. Id. at 167.
117. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1221.
118. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement With the Republic of Mexico,
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]; see
Schiff, supra note 6, at 119.
119. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 118, art. VII; Schiff, supra note 6, at 119.
120. Treaty with Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031; see also Schiff, supra
note 6, at 120.
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Mexican citizens in the Rio Grande Valley.12'
The United States initiated communication with Mexico regarding use
of the Rio Grande in 1880 when Texas farmers were upset at having been
deprived of irrigation due to ditches built by Mexican farmers along the
Mexican side of the river. 122 Mexico responded four years later by claim-
ing that its citizens had suffered more in 1880 than the Americans be-
cause that year had been extremely dry.12 3 The Mexicans also asserted
that they had prior appropriation claims against the United States over
Rio Grande water due to a dam located near El Paso/Ciudad Juarez. 124
Furthermore, the Mexicans alleged that American citizens in Colorado
and New Mexico had wastefully used the Rio Grande and that such waste
had further aggravated the water problems. 125 In response to the ongo-
ing conflicts, in 1889, both nations created the International Boundary
Commission (IBC), a precursor to the still-existent International Bound-
ary and Water Commission (IBWC).12 6 Despite the creation of the IBC,
disagreements and discussions between the two countries continued,
prompting U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon to issue an opinion in
1895, which became known as the Harmon Doctrine. 127 The opinion
stated that as an absolute sovereign under accepted principles of interna-
tional law, the United States had no duty to prohibit its citizens from
enjoying use of the water within its boundaries. 128
But despite the Harmon Doctrine, and because the IBC was unable to
resolve the Elephant Butte Dam conflict or other apportionment dis-
putes, in 1896 both the United States and Mexico requested for the IBC
to develop a solution to Rio Grande problems.1 29 After all, the mandate
of the IBC "was to settle '(a)ll differences or questions that may arise
on ... the frontier between the United States ... and ... Mexico where
the Rio Grande and the Colorado rivers form the boundary line."' 1 30
The IBC subsequently recommended that both nations develop a treaty
to resolve all future water disputes.131 This recommendation, along with
the other water disputes, led to the first water distribution treaty between
121. Schiff, supra note 6, at 120.
122. Barber, supra note 3, at 680.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Ingram, supra note 8, at 169.
126. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of Mex-
ico to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of No-
vember 12, 1884, and to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the
Changes Which Take Place in the Bed of the Rio Grande and That of the Colo-
rado River, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512; see also Schiff, supra note 6, at
120.
127. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo - International Law, 21 Op. Att'y. Gen. 274 (1895)
[hereinafter Harmon Doctrine]; see also Ingram, supra note 8. at 169.
128. Harmon Doctrine, supra note 127, at 274; see also Barber, supra note 3, at 681.
129. Schiff, supra note 6, at 120; Ingram, supra note 8, at 169.
130. Ingram, supra note 8, at 170 (quoting James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters
Affecting the United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27 (1938)).
131. Id.
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the United States and Mexico-the 1906 Rio Grande Convention. 132
2. The 1906 Treaty
The 1906 Rio Grande Convention intended to eliminate "all causes of
controversy" between the United States and Mexico regarding the Rio
Grande. 133 The preamble expressly declared that the convention covered
"equitable distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation pur-
poses. ' 134 Article I of the Rio Grande Convention required the United
States to annually deliver, and pay for the associated costs of such deliv-
ery, 60,000 acre-feet of water from the Elephant Butte Dam to Mexico. 135
In the event of extraordinary drought, article II allowed the United States
to diminish the amount of water it delivered to Mexico in proportion to
the amount delivered to various lands in the United States.1 36 While
Mexico benefited from the 1906 Convention in terms of water distribu-
tion, the convention did nothing more than serve as a general, non-bind-
ing agreement. Article V clearly stated that the 1906 Rio Grande
Convention established no legal principle or precedent. 37 This principle
has been prevalent in many agreements between the two nations. There-
fore, the United States could not be required to deliver additional water
in another setting based on the 1906 Convention. The limited nature of
the 1906 Convention led to both nations' desire to implement the 1944
Treaty, which still remains in effect.' 38
III. CURRENT LAW
A. TEXAS GROUNDWATER LAW
As discussed earlier, Texas has adhered to the rule of capture for its
groundwater law since the Texas Supreme Court's 1904 decision in the
Houston and Texas Central Railway case.' 39 But three exceptions have
developed to somewhat modify the rule of capture. 140 These exceptions
are: "(1) groundwater must be percolating, (2) groundwater that is with-
drawn from underneath one's own land may not be subject to waste, and
(3) groundwater cannot be withdrawn in order to maliciously injure
another."141
The requirement that groundwater must be percolating is important
because when groundwater is held as percolating, it falls within the doc-
132. Schiff, supra note 6, at 122.
133. Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable
Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, U.S.-Mex.,
May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 [hereinafter 1906 Rio Grande Convention].
134. Id. pmbl.
135. Id. art. I; Schiff, supra note 6, at 122.
136. 1906 Rio Grande Convention, supra note 133, art. II; Schiff, supra note 6, at 122.
137. 1906 Rio Grande Convention, supra note 133, art. V; Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
138. See Schiff, supra note 6, at 123-24.
139. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 81 S.W. at 279; see discussion supra Part II(A)(3).
140. Drummond, supra note 46, at 213.
141. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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trine of private ownership and thus is subject to the rule of capture. 142
Additionally, Texas law assumes that all groundwater is percolating by
default. 143 But if groundwater is an underflow or part of an underground
stream, the state owns that groundwater. 144 In that situation, the ground-
water becomes the property of Texas and is not subject to the rule of
capture. Nonetheless, there have been instances where the Texas legisla-
ture has determined that disputed groundwater was not an underflow or
an underground stream. 145 Thus, absent a unique case of groundwater
being seen as anything but percolating, any groundwater in Texas will be
held as percolating. Therefore, absent a special finding of being an un-
derflow, any groundwater in Texas is subject to the rule of capture.1 46
1. Senate Bill 1
After nearly 100 years of Texas following the rule of capture, the Texas
Legislature made the first significant change when it enacted Senate Bill 1
during the seventy-fifth regular legislative session in 1997.147 Senate Bill
1 has been described as "the most exhaustive rewrite of Texas water law
in the last thirty years. '148 Several developments led state leaders and
legislators to organize and push for the adoption of Senate Bill 1.149 The
three chief factors were: (1) the severe drought in the mid 1990s, (2) the
estimated population boom and the ensuing "potential tapping out of
Texas's water supply," 150 and (3) the gravity of the situation considering
the fact that Texas had not utilized any of the previous water plans.
151
Senate Bill 1 serves a tripartite function of water resource planning,
management, and development. 152 In effect, it "splits regulatory over-
sight and responsibility among three state agencies. ' 153 The Texas Water
Development Board (TWDB), 154 the Texas Commission on Environmen-
tal Quality (TCEQ) (formerly the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission), and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department now share
responsibilities for water resources. 155 The effects of Senate Bill 1 are
seen in the Sipriano case, where the Texas Supreme Court declined to
142. Id. at 210.
143. See Tex. Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273 (Tex. 1927); Drummond, supra note 46, at
211.
144. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 2000); Drummond, supra note 46, at
211.
145. See Drummond, supra note 46, at 211.
146. See Tex. Co., 296 S.W. at 278.
147. Act of June 2, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610 (codified
and amended in various sections of TEX. WATER CODE ANN.).
148. Martin Hubert, Senate Bill 1, The First Big and Bold Step Toward Meeting Texas's
Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 53, 54 (1999) (including an endorse-
ment by then Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock).
149. Id. at 55.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 55-56.
152. Id. at 54.
153. Drummond, supra note 46, at 206.
154. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 6.012 (Vernon 2000).
155. Hubert, supra note 148, at 56.
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make a sweeping change to the rule of capture opting instead to let the
new legislation develop. 15 6
In regards to groundwater, Senate Bill 1 authorizes a more aggressive
management scheme at the local level, more resources for groundwater
management, and more accountability when groundwater management is
undertaken. 15 7 But the most significant effect of Senate Bill 1 is the
strengthening and expansion of Groundwater Conservation Districts
(GCDs).158 Although article 4 of the bill does not expressly overrule the
rule of capture, it places greater emphasis on GCDs, giving them more
regulatory power. 159 According to Senate Bill 1, GCDs are the most pre-
ferred method of groundwater management. 60 GCDs are preferred pri-
marily because they require local control.' 6' This places the management
of groundwater in the hands of those most familiar with the groundwater
in that particular district.162
2. Groundwater Conservation Districts
GCDs are localized districts that assist in "groundwater management
by preventing waste, performing research, and protecting the aquifer,"
among other things. 163 Although GCDs have been in existence in some
form for the past fifty years, 164 under Senate Bill 1, the requirements for
groundwater withdrawal in the districts are more stringent.' 65 Some spe-
cific duties and rights of GCDs include issuing well permits, preventing
waste, imposing limits on well spacing and production, regulating water
transfers between districts, transporting and distributing groundwater and
surface water, acquiring and selling property, and levying property
taxes. 166 Currently, Texas has eighty-three confirmed GCDs, but four
more districts are pending confirmation from the TCEQ.167 The Ground-
water Conservation Districts map illustrates the location of all confirmed
and pending GCDs overlaying a map divided by counties within Texas. 168
GCDs can be created in a number of ways, including special legislative
sessions, petitions by property owners, or by the TCEQ.169
156. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80; Drummond, supra note 46, at 206.
157. Hubert, supra note 148, at 65.
158. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1241.
159. Drummond, supra note 46, at 206.
160. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (Vernon 2000); Hubert, supra note 148, at 65.
161. Hubert, supra note 148, at 66.
162. See id.
163. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1241.
164. Drummond, supra note 46, at 207.
165. Hubert, supra note 148, at 66.
166. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.002, 36.101 (Vernon 2000); Drummond, supra note
46, at 206.
167. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTS.: CONFIRMED &
PENDING CONFIRMATION, available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/maps/
pdf/gcd-only_8xll.pdf (last modified Jan. 19, 2005); See Drummond, supra note
46, at 206.
168. See Groundwater Conservation Districts map, available at http://www.twdb.state.
tx.us/mapping/maps/pdf/gcd-only_8xll.pdf (last modified Jan. 19, 2005).
169. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1241.
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In additionto establishing GCDs, Senate Bill 1 demands more account-
ability in the form of groundwater management plans from GCDs.170
These plans must address the following management goals: "(1) providing
the most efficient use of groundwater; (2) controlling and preventing
waste of groundwater; (3) controlling and preventing subsidence; (4) ad-
dressing conjunctive surface water management issues; (5) addressing
natural resource issues; (6) addressing drought conditions; and (7) ad-
dressing conservation.' 71 Moreover, while GCDs have developed
groundwater management plans in the past, these plans must now be
more comprehensive and certified by the TWDB when the plan is admin-
istratively complete.' 72 The State Auditor has authority to audit all
groundwater district plans one year after their original certification.1 73
These audits determine whether the GCD's management plan is opera-
tional.1 74 If the district is not operational, the TCEQ "has the authority
to take the appropriate action necessary to produce comprehensive man-
agement in the district."'1 75
3. Priority Groundwater Management Areas
In addition to GCDs, Senate Bill 1 focuses on areas the TCEQ and
TWDB have identified as possibly experiencing substantial groundwater
problems in the next twenty-five years.' 76 These areas, formerly referred
to as critical areas, are now known as Priority Groundwater Management
Areas (PGMAs). 177 But an area may not be declared a PGMA until the
TCEQ has conducted a detailed study of that area. 178 Current PGMAs
include the Briscoe, Hale, and Swisher County Critical Area; the Dallam
County Critical Area; the Hill Country Critical Area; the Regan, Upton,
and Midland County Critical Area, and the El Paso Critical Area.179 The
Groundwater Conservation Districts with Groundwater Management Ar-
eas and Priority Groundwater Management Areas map shows the five
existing PGMAs overlying the GCDs in Texas.'8 0 PGMAs are protected
by GCDs; thus Senate Bill 1, through its establishment and regulation of
GCDs, has streamlined the process for creating PGMAs.' 8 ' Through the
170. Hubert, supra note 148, at 66.
171. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071 (Vernon 2000).
172. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1072 (Vernon 2000); See Hubert, supra note 148, at
66.
173. Hubert, supra note 148, at 66.
174. Id.
175. Hubert, supra note 148, at 66; see also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.303 (Vernon
2000).
176. Hubert, supra note 148, at 67.
177. Id.
178. Drummond, supra note 46, at 207 n.290.
179. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DiSTS. WITH GROUND-
WATER MGMT. AREAS & PRIORITY GROUNDWATER MGMT. AREAS, available at
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/maps/pdf/gcd-gma-pgma-24x24.pdf (last
modified Jan. 19, 2005) [hereinafter TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD].
180. See id.
181. Hubert, supra note 148, at 67.
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implementation of PGMAs and strengthening of GCDs, Senate Bill 1 has
helped to make Texas groundwater law less reliant on the rule of capture.
B. MEXICAN GROUNDWATER LAW
As mentioned above, Mexico distinguishes its water law based on
whether the water is private or public.182 In Mexico, water is national
property. 183 According to paragraph 5 of article 27 of the Mexican Con-
stitution of 1917, "[o]wnership of the lands and waters within the bounda-
ries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has
had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby
constituting private property."'1 84 Thus, while water may be privately
owned, the government may place limits on ownership if the public inter-
est so demands.1 85 Additionally, the Mexican Constitution specifically
addresses groundwater in article 27 which states:
Underground waters may be brought to the surface by artificial
works and utilized by the surface owner, but if the public interest so
requires or use by others is affected, the Federal Executive may reg-
ulate its extraction and utilization, and even establish prohibited ar-
eas, the same as may be done with other waters in the public
domain. 186
Therefore, although private landowners can withdraw and utilize
groundwater, that right may be taken away or limited by the Mexican
government whenever the government feels that it is necessary to best
further the public interest. Mexico has reinforced this idea by passing
legislation that supports governmental control of groundwater including
Le Ley de Conservacion del Suelo y Aguas (The Law of Conservation of
Groundwater of 1956), which established restricted zones and a permit
system for withdrawal of groundwater.187 More recently, Mexico created
the Comision Nacional de Aguas (CNA) to provide and regulate the use
of water.' 88 The difference between the Mexican rule authorizing gov-
ernment intervention and the rule of capture in Texas evidences one rea-
son why a uniform system of groundwater allocation has been difficult to
achieve.' 89
182. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1243; see discussion supra Part II(A)(4).
183. Octavio E. Chavez, Mining of Internationally Shared Aquifers: The El Paso-Juarez
Case, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 237, 241 (2000).
184. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), art. 27 [here-
inafter Mexico Const.]; Barber, supra note 3, at 662.
185. Barber, supra note 3, at 662.
186. Mexican Const., supra note 184, art. 27; Barber, supra note 3, at 662.
187. See Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1243-44 (internal citations omitted).
188. See Bennett & Herzog, supra note 10, at 981.
189. See Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1244.
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C. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
As discussed previously, the United States and Mexico have histori-
cally relied on treaties or agreements to govern their various water
sources.190 While these treaties have not truly solved any groundwater
problems, the agreements currently in effect are somewhat more effective
at managing the shared water sources. Looking at current treaties and
the organizations those treaties have established to manage surface and
groundwater should prove beneficial in developing a more functional and
efficient agreement between the United States. and Mexico.
1. The 1944 Treaty
After the 1906 Rio Grande Convention failed to significantly resolve
the dispute between the United States and Mexico, there was a down
time for several years during which both nations made little effort to ne-
gotiate a workable water treaty. 191 But in the late 1920s, both sides be-
gan to discuss a possible treaty. 192 Although nothing happened
immediately, in February 1944, the United States and Mexico entered
into a new treaty to govern their international watercourses. 193
The 1944 Treaty purported to designate the rights of the United States
and Mexico to the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and to the Rio Grande
from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico.194 The treaty, in article
4, created a schedule of water rights to allot the Rio Grande's waters to
the United States and Mexico. 195 Specifically, the treaty allocated to
Mexico,
(a) All of the waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande
(Rio Bravo) from the San Juan and Alamo Rivers, including the re-
turn flow from the lands irrigated from the latter two rivers. (b)
One-half of the flow in the main channel of the Rio Grande (Rio
Bravo) below the lowest major international storage dam, so far as
said flow is not specifically allotted under this Treaty to either of the
two countries. (c) Two-thirds of the flow reaching the main channel
of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from the Conchos, San Diego, San
Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo,
subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c) of paragraph B of this
Article. (d) One-half of all other flows not otherwise allotted by this
Article occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande (Rio
Bravo), including the contributions from all the unmeasured tributa-
ries, which are those not named in this Article, between Fort Quit-
man and the lowest major international storage dam.196
190. See discussion supra Part II(B).
191. See Schiff, supra note 6, at 123.
192. Id.
193. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization
of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex.,
Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty]; Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
194. Barber, supra note 3, at 683.
195. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 4; Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
196. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 4(A).
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Correspondingly, the United States was to receive the other half of the
Rio Grande between Fort Quitman and the Gulf of Mexico and one-third
of the water from the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and
Salado Rivers and Las Vacas Arroyo. 197 Today, Mexico must deliver
350,000 acre-feet of Rio Grande water to the United States annually
while the United States must deliver 1.5 million acre-feet of water to
Mexico from the Colorado River.198 Despite the extensive details in allo-
cating the surface water between the United States and Mexico, the 1944
Treaty does not specifically address groundwater.199 But the IBWC, a
governing body created by the 1944 Treaty, has the potential to monitor
groundwater for internationally shared aquifers.200
Besides allocating the surface water, the 1944 Treaty instructs that if
Mexico fails to deliver its required amount of water to the United States
because of extraordinary drought, it must make up for the deficiency in
the subsequent five-year period.20 1 Additionally, in repaying for its defi-
ciency, Mexico is required to pay double, meaning the debt from the pre-
vious five-year period plus the next five-year period's allotment. 20 2
Mexico has been incurring a water debt like this since the extensive
drought of the mid-1990s but has not yet been able to repay it.203 As of
2003, Mexico's debt to the United States was 1.37 million acre-feet of
water.20 4
2. The International Boundary Water Commission
In addition to designating the water rights for the United States and
Mexico, the 1944 Treaty extended the scope of the IBC by creating the
IBWC.20 5 The IBWC serves as an agent of the United States and Mexico
in their search for the equitable allocation of water to both nations.20 6
The stated mission of the IBWC is:
To apply the rights and obligations which the Governments of the
United States and Mexico assume under the numerous boundary and
water treaties and related agreements, and to do so in a way that
benefits the social and economic welfare of the peoples on the two
sides of the boundary and improves relations between the two
197. See id. art. 4(B); Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
198. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 4(B); Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
199. Douglas L. Hayes, The All-American Canal Lining Project: A Catalyst for Rational
and Comprehensive Groundwater Management on the United States-Mexico Bor-
der, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803 (1991).
200. Chavez, supra note 183, at 241-42.
201. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 4(B)(d); Ingram, supra note 8, at 171.
202. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 4(B)(d); Ingram, supra note 8, at 172.
203. Ross E. Milloy, A Rift over Rio Grande Water Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001,
at A14; Schiff, supra note 6, at 118.
204. Schiff, supra note 6, at 132.
205. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 1; Ingram, supra note 8, at 172.
206. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 20, at 442.
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countries. 207
Additionally, the IBWC has a larger jurisdiction than the former IBC
had because the IBWC covers inland areas where international dams ex-
ist, as well as the Rio Grande.20 8 The IBWC also maintains two separate
headquarters-one in El Paso, Texas and the other in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico. 209
In addition to allocating water between the United States and Mexico,
the 1944 Treaty empowers the IBWC to settle all disputes arising under
the treaty.210 Article 24 declares the IBWC as the first and normally final
arbiter of disputes. 211 Subparagraph (c) gives the IBWC supervisory
powers, while subparagraph (d) grants the IBWC the role of settling dis-
putes. 212 The IBWC must also administer all treaties regarding the Colo-
rado, Rio Grande, and Tijuana Rivers.213 Because the IBWC's duties
include treaty interpretation, dispute resolution, and "operational respon-
sibilities for managing both the border and international dams," it oper-
ates as a sort of a bureaucratic hybrid.214 These varied responsibilities
have caused the IBWC to function in an ad hoc manner as opposed to
taking a proactive planning approach.215
The IBWC maintains the status of an international body with separate
Mexican and U S. sections.216 But despite the diplomatic status of IBWC
commissioners, they traditionally operate as protectors of their respective
national sovereign interests. 2 17 Naturally, this division of interests has led
to an adversarial relationship between the Mexican and American com-
missioners. 218 Because of the independent status of the Mexican and
U.S. sections of the IBWC and the self-protective relationships that have
ensued, the IBWC must change in order to deal with the controversies
existing in the twenty-first century.219 But an encouraging prospect exists
whether the IBWC modifies its role or merely enacts new agreements.
As mentioned earlier, the 1944 Treaty does not specifically address
groundwater, 220 but "recent working groups and policy discussions indi-
cate that the future of the IBWC will include groundwater." 221
207. IBWC, The International Boundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organi-
zation, and Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, http://www.
ibwc.state.gov/html/about-us.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter IBWC].
208. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 2; IBWC, supra note 207, $$ 1-4.
209. IBWC, supra note 207, $ 4.
210. Barber, supra note 3, at 683.
211. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 24; Schiff, supra note 6, at 131.
212. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, arts. 24(c)-(d); Schiff, supra note 6, at 131.
213. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 20, at 415.
214. Ingram, supra note 8, at 172-73.
215. Id. at 173.
216. Id. at 172.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 181.
219. ld. at 181-82.
220. See discussion supra Part III(C)(1).
221. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1237.
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3. Current Agreements
Although no official groundwater agreement exists between the United
States and Mexico, several agreements are in place that either, (1) pertain
to surface water but can relate to groundwater, or (2) are informal agree-
ments covering groundwater.222 One such agreement is the Minute of the
1944 Treaty.2 23 Under article 25 of the 1944 Treaty, the IBWC develops
rules and issues decisions in minutes.22 4 Minutes are considered ap-
proved by both governments and then binding if neither government ob-
jects to the minute within thirty days.225 Although minutes may be
considered an executive agreement if both countries ratify them, they are
not the equivalent of a formal treaty.22 6 Thus, minutes are helpful in the
current situation, but not a real cure to the existing problems.
a. Minute 242
Minute 242 has been called "[t]he closest approximation to an existing
groundwater agreement along the U.S.-Mexico border. ' '227 Signed in
1973, it recognizes that an agreement concerning groundwater between
the United States and Mexico is necessary.228 Although Minute 242 pri-
marily deals with water quality and salinity, it also specifically addresses
groundwater: 229
With the objective of avoiding future problems, the United States
and Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any
new development of either the surface or the groundwater resources,
or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in
its own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the
other country. 230
In addition, Minute 242 calls for a limit to groundwater pumping until
both nations create a more inclusive agreement.231 Finally, the agree-
ment requires that both countries communicate about new developments
of groundwater resources.232 For these reasons, it has been asserted that
Minute 242 brought groundwater within the scope of the 1944 Treaty.233
But while Minute 242 was a step in the right direction of managing the
222. Id. at 1237-38.
223. Ingram, supra note 8, at 188.
224. 1944 Treaty, supra note 193, art. 25; Ingram, supra note 8, at 188.
225. Barber, supra note 3, at 684.
226. Id.
227. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1238.
228. See IBWC, Permanent and Definite Solution to the International Problem of the
Salinity of the Colorado River, Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24
U.S.T. 1971, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/min242.pdf
[hereinafter Minute 2421; Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1238.
229. Minute 242, supra note 228, 5-6.
230. Id. 6; Barberis, supra note 39, at 180.
231. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1238.
232. Minute 242, supra note 228, 6.
233. Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities for
Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 341, 342 (2000).
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groundwater dispute, the goal of that IBWC decision remains
unfulfilled.2 34
b. Bellagio Draft Treaty
Because former and existing treaties and agreements governing shared
groundwater between the United States and Mexico do not address spe-
cific issues like pollution and subsidence, scholars worked for eight years
writing an agreement that could function as a starting point.235 That
agreement, known today as the Bellagio Draft Treaty, "provides a model
for how countries can initiate a joint study of the resources and coopera-
tively manage the shared supply. ' '2 36 The Bellagio Draft Treaty can be
used by nations aftempting to create an international water policy, as it
was inspired by the water situation along the United States-Mexico bor-
der.2 37 "The overriding goal of the draft treaty is to achieve joint, opti-
mum utilization of the available waters, facilitated by procedures for
avoidance or resolution of differences over shared groundwaters in the
face of the ever increasing pressures on this priceless resource. '238
The authors of the Draft Treaty believed that determining water rights
by mutual agreement was superior to rights achieved by unilateral tak-
ing.239 Additionally, the drafters felt that any rational conservation or
protection action required the resource management of all parties in-
volved in the agreement. 240 One scholar has summarized the principles
of the Draft Treaty in the following way:
First, it draws a connection between the customary international law
on surface waters and that on groundwaters. Second, it links the
supply and quality of groundwater, and balances the emphasis on
allocation with an emphasis on water quality management and public
health. Third, it emphasizes that the twin goals of (1) "optimum util-
ization and conservation" and (2) "the need to protect the under-
ground environment" must be balanced on "an equitable and
reasonable basis." Fourth, it emphasizes the need for the parties "to
develop and maintain reliable data and information concerning
transboundary aquifers and their waters." Finally, the Draft Treaty
emphasizes the value of establishing transboundary groundwater
conservation areas and conservation management plans.2 41
Such principles show the importance of the United States and Mexico
being flexible and fair in proposing solutions to the groundwater dis-
234. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1238; Mumme, supra note 233, at 342.
235. Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for Solving Border
Groundwater Issues, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 57, 58 (2003); Barber, supra note 3, at 691.
236. O'Leary, supra note 235, at 58.
237. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1232.
238. Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 665 (1989).
239. Id. at 664.
240. Id.
241. Mumme, supra note 233, at 358.
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pute. 242 Apart from the five tenets listed, the treaty also outlines tools
for managing shared international aquifers. 243 Moreover, the Draft
Treaty contains guidance for water quality protection, dispute resolution,
and management plans in order to achieve the optimum utilization of
shared groundwater resources.244
Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of the Bellagio Draft Treaty is the
structure it envisions through which the United States and Mexico can
communicate about the management of their shared aquifers.245 The
Draft Treaty describes this structure as a bilateral institution where both
nations participate in the study and management of shared groundwater
resources.246 This bilateral institution should take the form of a joint
commission with the task of "carefully managing the development of the
aquifer and associated surface waters. '2 47 It has been suggested that the
IBWC would be an appropriate agency to take on this role, since it has
already operated in this manner. 248 But due to the difficulties the IBWC
has faced because of the adversarial nature of both independent nations,
this may not be the most effective option. 249 A modified IBWC could
function as the commission proposed by the Bellagio Draft Treaty. An-
other option would be the creation of an entirely new commission to spe-
cifically fit what the authors of the Draft Treaty envisioned.
4. International Groundwater Law
International law governs the relations between sovereign states, and is
based on the notion that all states have equal dignity.250 The principal
sources of international law generally are treaties and custom. 251 But
when it comes to international water law specifically, the principal
sources are: "(1) the United States law of equitable apportionment, (2)
international non-navigational use rules developed by international con-
sultative bodies, (3) bi- or multi-national treaties allocating the uses of
specific river basins or creating a regime of shared waters and (4) the
developing law of state liability for environmental injury. 252
While the original theory behind international water use was absolute
territorial sovereignty, this has been replaced by the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty.2 53 Absolute sovereignty held that each state could
use the water within its border any way it chose, owing no duty to neigh-
242. Id.
243. O'Leary, supra note 235, at 58.
244. Hardberger, supra note 15, at 1233.
245. O'Leary, supra note 235, at 58.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 59.
248. Barber, supra note 3, at 691.
249. See discussion supra Part III(C)(2).
250. TURLOCK, supra note 17, § 11:2.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. § 11:4.
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boring states.254 U.S. Attorney General Harmon developed this principle
in 1895 as a result of the United States-Mexican dispute over the Rio
Grande. 255 Limited territorial sovereignty, on the other hand, follows the
main common law and civil law principle of riparian rights-that all states
sharing a watercourse have the right to use that resource.256
While historically the principles of international water law have been
guided by absolute or limited territorial sovereignty, today the law of in-
ternational groundwater law is shaped by four guiding principles.257
"These... include the obligation not to cause appreciable harm, the duty
of equitable and reasonable use, the obligation of prior notification, and
the duty to negotiate. ' 258 The obligation not to cause appreciable harm
includes ensuring that activities within a state's jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to another state's environment or areas exceeding the
limits of the state's national jurisdiction.259
The rule of equitable and reasonable use applies both to the apportion-
ment of groundwater as well as the use of such sources. 260 As applied to
aquifer use, this means tailoring withdrawals to coincide with the
recharge of that source.261 When considering apportionment, each nation
should receive benefits that provide maximum utilization from the distri-
bution of the shared aquifer. 262 It has been argued that the United States
and Mexico do not have reasonable and equitable apportionment be-
cause the American side of the border has its needs met more sufficiently
than the Mexican side.26 3 But when two nations share an aquifer, as the
United States and Mexico do, the equitable solution would be that each
country may withdraw the proportionate shared of the aquifer lying in its
territory. 264
Finally, if a nation is uncertain whether a groundwater withdrawal will
cause appreciable harm or whether such use will be equitable or reasona-
ble, it has a duty to provide prior notification and negotiate any with-
drawal or use with the neighboring country.265 Thus, nations should
"establish a procedure whereby each will communicate the plan and the
necessary data to the other for determination of the likely effects of the
project on the groundwater. '266 By following the established interna-
tional groundwater law principles and looking to the treaties that have
been effective, the United States and Mexico should be able to create a
254. Id.; Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Bur-
ied, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 725 (1996).
255. McCaffrey, supra note 254, at 725.
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new agreement, or at least modify an existing one, which adequately
manages the aquifers the nations share along the Texas-Mexico border.
IV. SUGGESTIONS
As discussed throughout this comment, the United States, more specifi-
cally Texas, and Mexico have had water disputes for over 150 years. 26 7
Although the implementation of several agreements and treaties has
somewhat alleviated the problem, the concern over the quantity and
quality of international groundwater resources shows that a more com-
plete solution is still necessary. 268 As the potential for conflict over ever-
diminishing resources increases, it is vital to develop some way to manage
this problem. Most suggestions revolve around the idea of a new agree-
ment or treaty; but other legislative acts are possible as well.
A. CHANGING TEXAS LAW
As seen earlier, Texas is one of only a few states that still adhere to the
rule of capture. This led one scholar to conclude that the Texas legisla-
ture should discard the rule of capture as the controlling law of ground-
water ownership. 26 9 He suggests adopting the correlative rights doctrine
that allows for groundwater withdrawal from one's property as long as
the amount taken does not exceed the proportionate size of the overlying
property. 270 While there are several benefits to abandoning the rule of
capture, it seems unlikely that this will have any real effect on the Texas-
Mexico dispute. Because of the different laws and cultures of the two
nations, an international agreement is necessary to truly aid the ground-
water situation along the Texas-Mexico border.
B. CREATING A NEW INTERNATIONAL TREATY
The purpose of any international groundwater agreement should be to
successfully use and protect the shared aquifer in a fair and sustainable
manner.271 It should "be flexible enough to deal with different situations
surrounding shared groundwater but specific enough to demand the co-
operation necessary. '2 7 2 Any new agreement should encompass the four
duties that serve as the basis for international groundwater law-not to
cause appreciable harm, equitable and reasonable use, prior notification,
and negotiation. 273 Several agreements presently exist that serve as good
models for a new treaty governing United States-Mexico groundwater
allocation.
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1. The U.N. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses
Mexico brought the Convention on International Watercourses before
the United Nations for deliberation in 1997.274 The United States, along
with thirty-three other nations, co-sponsored the convention. 275 Both
countries voted for adoption of the convention, but neither government
had formally ratified it as of 2003.276 But because the convention pur-
ports to follow equitable utilization and no significant harm, it could
serve as a relevant tool to aid both nations as they attempt to solve con-
tinued groundwater allocation problems.2 77
A significant effect of the Convention on International Watercourses is
its inclusion of groundwater in the terms. The drafters defined water-
course as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing
into a common terminus," and international watercourse as any water-
course as "parts of which are situated in different States. ' 278 This is im-
portant because, as discussed earlier, no previous agreement on
international water covered the issue of groundwater. While Minute 242
specifically addresses groundwater, it is essentially no more than an ad-
dendum to the 1944 Treaty.279 Moreover, this definition acknowledges
the interrelatedness of surface and groundwater in the hydrological cy-
cle. 280 This recognition is important because it means that an aquifer
does not have to actually sit on both sides of an international border to be
considered international water, as long as that aquifer is hydraulically re-
lated to a river that crosses or forms an international border.28 1 For ex-
ample, an aquifer that is located only in Texas but somehow connected to
the Rio Grande would be considered international groundwater. Thus,
by incorporating groundwater in its provisions, the Convention on Inter-
national Watercourses could become the precedent that future agree-
ments look to in shaping international groundwater disputes.
In addition to the importance of the terms of the convention, all provi-
sions of the convention may be incorporated into existing treaties.28 2
Therefore, the terms including groundwater in the definition of water-
course could be absorbed into the 1944 Treaty relating specifically to the
274. Convention on the Law of The Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (Apr.
11, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter International Watercourse Con-
vention]; Ingram, supra note 8, at 196.
275. Ingram, supra note 8, at 196.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 198.
278. International Watercourse Convention, supra note 274, arts. 2(a)-(b), 36 I.L.M. at
704.
279. See Barber, supra note 3, at 684.
280. Eckstein, supra note 29, at 229.
281. Id. at 229-30.
282. See International Watercourse Convention, supra note 274, arts. 3(1)-(2), 36 I.L.M.
at 705.
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United States and Mexico. 283 This is not a complete solution, however,
because the 1944 Treaty's allocation provisions relate to specific rivers,
simply incorporating groundwater into this agreement would not prove
all that helpful in managing the aquifers shared between Texas and Mex-
ico.284 Despite the benefits of the Convention on International Water-
courses, it is likely too broad to serve as anything more than general
guidance in a new treaty.
2. Revitalized 1944 Treaty
Rather than drafting an entirely new treaty or creating a new commis-
sion, it has often been suggested that the 1944 Treaty could be revital-
ized.28 5 This would include adding a new policy minute which would
focus on shared responsibilities, long-term strategies, and heightened ap-
plication of international legal norms and principles. 286 Obviously, the
new 1944 Treaty would need to specifically address groundwater, but as
discussed earlier, this is possible through the Convention on International
Watercourses. A new 1944 Treaty would be beneficial, but it would still
not be the exact groundwater agreement that both countries need. Be-
cause of the limited area of the Rio Grande region, Texas and Mexico
should look to an agreement that is more limited and localized.
3. Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer Agreement
The 1978 agreement between France and Switzerland pertaining to
shared groundwater resources in the Lake Geneva Basin is the only inter-
national agreement that specifically addresses an international aquifer. 287
One of the most important features of this agreement is that it is regional
rather than national in nature.288 By serving as an arrangement between
local authorities, the agreement directly meets the needs of those affected
most by the aquifer. 289 The agreement also provides for a commission
comprised of members from both nations that creates annual plans for
aquifer use and groundwater protection measures. 290 This seems similar
to the IBWC; but one difference is that the Franco-Swiss Aquifer Agree-
ment has been successful in managing the shared aquifer.29 1 The agree-
ment achieved success by focusing on equitable utilization while avoiding
the ideas of territorial sovereignty in order to fulfill the needs of the Lake
283. See Ingram, supra note 8, at 199.
284. See 1944 Treaty, supra note 195, art. 4.
285. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 8, at 191.
286. Id. at 191-93.
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uifer.htm).
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Geneva area.292
Texas and Mexico could develop a similar agreement that applies to all
the shared groundwater along the border.293 Such an agreement would
need to be tailored to address the specific needs of the border area and
the aquifers located in that region.294 Because any new agreement should
also have a commission or governing body to enforce the agreement and
plan for future needs, the IBWC is the most obvious choice to serve this
function. 295 Perhaps Texas and Mexico could model the Franco-Swiss
Aquifer Agreement by also having water specialists serve on the IBWC,
and trying to attain equitable utilization rather than each nation's repre-
sentatives trying to enforce the goals of their respective country. But
whether the IBWC operates as the commission or an entirely new com-
mission is created, the control should be kept at the local level, similar to
the Franco-Swiss Agreement and the Groundwater Conservation Dis-
tricts in Texas. By allowing the IBWC comprised of both Americans and
Mexicans to serve as this body and keeping the control localized and spe-
cific to the Rio Grande area, Texas and Mexico may find a mutually ben-
eficial solution to their groundwater dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
The area near the border between Texas and Mexico has struggled with
its water supply for as long as the Rio Grande has served as the interna-
tional boundary. As surface water has diminished, the importance of
groundwater has grown. Today the conflict between the two states cen-
ters around several shared aquifers, either crossing the border or linked
through the hydrologic system to the Rio Grande. Achieving a resolution
has proven difficult because the law has historically treated groundwater
differently than surface water. As a result, most water agreements in the
past have either addressed only surface water or mentioned groundwater
simply as an afterthought to the main water law.
Groundwater law has evolved over the years, beginning with the rule
of absolute ownership in England and later being modified by the reason-
able use rule in the United States. But Texas has continued to follow the
doctrine of absolute ownership or, as it is more commonly referred to in
Texas, the rule of capture. In contrast, Mexican groundwater law, devel-
oped from Spanish law, has been characterized by Roman and Moorish
customs. These influences include the distinction between the right to
use water and the ownership of that water, and the notion that water
belongs to the community. Texas and Mexico have attempted to resolve
the differences in their laws through the use of agreements and interna-
tional organizations including the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the IBC,
and the 1906 Rio Grande Convention.
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2006]
242 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
While Texas still adheres to the rule of capture generally, this has been
modified by the passage of Senate Bill 1. That legislation calls for in-
creased focus on groundwater with control concentrated mostly at the
local level. Senate Bill 1 accomplishes this reform by strengthening
GCDs and focusing on especially critical areas known as PGMAs. Con-
versely, Mexico still retains the distinction between public and private
groundwater. As in the past, Texas and Mexico rely on agreements and
treaties to allocate their respective water uses and rights. The 1944 Treaty
specifically allocated the surface water to the United States and Mexico
and also created the IBWC, which serves as the international organiza-
tion governing water disputes between both nations. Minute 242 of the
IBWC is one of the few agreements to specifically address groundwater,
but does not have the force of a treaty. Additionally, the Bellagio Draft
Treaty provides a workable framework for the United States and Mexico
to create a more beneficial water policy.
Examining international water law-from its original theory of absolute
territorial sovereignty to the modern obligations not to cause harm and
equitable and reasonable use-gives a helpful outline for Texas and Mex-
ico to follow in developing a better-functioning groundwater agreement.
Because an international agreement is the most viable option for resolv-
ing the water allocation issues between the two nations, the U.N. Con-
vention on International Watercourses serves as a starting point for any
agreement relating to the border area. But since the convention is so
broad, a more localized agreement should be created for Texas and Mex-
ico. Thus, an agreement like the Franco-Swiss Aquifer Agreement that
utilizes an international body to govern and plan for specific international
aquifers emerges as the best option. By allowing the IBWC comprised of
both Americans and Mexicans to serve as this body and by keeping the
control localized and specific to the Rio Grande area, both Texas and
Mexico should be able to maintain an adequate water supply.
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